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1. Introduction 
In recent years, theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have made increasing 
efforts to defend organisms as biological players in their own right against overly gene-centred 
views of life both in developmental and evolutionary biology (in the latter case specifically in 
the context of the so-called Modern Synthesis). Pursuing a non-reductionist systems biological 
approach, these scholars emphasise the autonomous character of organisms as self-
organising biological systems (e.g., Moreno & Mossio 2015, Walsh 2015, Rosslenbroich 2014), 
thereby referring back to the older theory of autopoiesis (Varela 1979, Maturana & Varela 
1980).1 Organisms and their characteristic development, it is argued, cannot be understood 
by looking at their parts only; it is the specific interplay of the parts, their organisation, that 
needs to be studied as giving rise to a functioning autonomous whole. This is believed to 
provide new avenues also for the understanding of evolution. Evolution, on this view, turns 
out to be ‘enacted’ by organisms as “autonomous, purposive systems” (Walsh 2015, 217).    
In what follows, I shall investigate some of the basic ontological implications of this approach. 
What sort of entity, ontologically speaking, is the supposedly autonomous organism? The 
semantics of the term ‘autonomy’, no less than those of the term ‘autopoiesis’, might invoke 
the idea of some self-contained, self-sufficient object, not in need for its existence of anything 
else. This would correspond with a broadly substance ontological view of organisms or reality 
in general. A substance, according to Aristotle who invented the concept, is a discrete 
particular that is ontologically independent and the enduring subject of change of accidental 
properties (Robinson 2014). Thus there is believed to be an intrinsic unchanging core in every 
substance, defined by a set of essential properties or capacities and serving as the substratum 
                                                          
1 For a defence of a non-reductionist systems biological stance on organisms that draws on Robert Rosen’s 
cognate idea of organisms as metabolism-repair systems cf. Cornish-Bowden (2006). 
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for any change to occur. Change and process, if there are any, depend on substances. More 
generally, the world is seen as most fundamentally consisting of things, i.e., entities the 
identities of which can be defined independently of change, and which are neatly separated 
from one another.2 
Substance or thing ontology is the default view in Western metaphysics. Explicitly or implicitly, 
it guides philosophical investigation in its entire spectrum.3 This includes the philosophy of 
biology as evident from the predominance of mechanistic theory programmes, reflecting and 
underpinning corresponding research agendas and methods in the contemporary biological 
sciences (Bechtel 2006, Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, Glennan 2002, Machamer et al. 2000). 
The behaviour of living systems is explained in terms of the interactions of their parts, i.e., in 
terms of so-called mechanisms, where the parts constituting those mechanisms are taken to 
be discrete entities with certain intrinsic capacities.4  
However, there is an alternative ontology, as emphasised recently by a minority group of 
philosophers of biology, biology-inspired metaphysicians and biologists: process ontology 
(Nicholson & Dupré 2018, Meincke 2018a, Simons 2018, Jaeger & Monk 2015, Campbell 2015, 
Ulanowicz 2013, Bapteste & Dupré 2013, Dupré 2012, Jaeger et al. 2012, Bickhard 2011).5 
Process ontology takes process and change to be ontologically primary, assuming that things, 
if there are any, are derived from process. Things, or ‘substances’, it is argued, have to be 
reconceptualised as stabilised higher-order processes that persist as long as stabilisation can 
                                                          
2 The term ‘thing’ as I use it is wider than the technical term ‘substance’ that, within the philosophical discourse, 
refers to either the specific Aristotelian (essentialist) concept of a discrete particular (belonging to some natural 
kind) or to some of its later derivatives, e.g., the Cartesian concepts of mental versus material substance 
(substance dualism). It is worth stressing, though, that ‘thing’, in the definition given above, is a technical term 
too, alluding to the everyday understanding of the word but not necessarily coinciding with it.  
3 For notable exceptions see the overview of the history of process philosophy in Seibt (2016). Seibt, who was 
the first to promote process philosophy in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics, has repeatedly 
diagnosed Western metaphysics with being under the spell of the ‘myth of substance’, cf., e.g., Seibt (1997), 143. 
4 The relations between the so-called New Mechanism, substance ontology and process ontology are, however, 
complex. The New Mechanists do not deny the existence and relevance of processes; instead, most of them 
endorse a dualistic ontology according to which mechanisms are composed of entities and activities (the latter 
also being called interactions or operations) (Machamer et al. 2000, Bechtel 2006, Illari & Williamson 2013). Yet, 
what distinguishes these accounts from genuine process ontological accounts is the assumption that entities 
composing mechanisms can be identified independently of the activities or processes in which they are involved. 
This is in line with the further substance ontological tenet that for every process there must be a substance on 
which this process is ontologically dependent. 
5 A close affinity to process ontology is also apparent in Hans Jonas’ philosophy of the organism (Jonas 1966) as 
well as in the organicist movement in biology in the mid of last century (most notably, Waddington 1956), both 
currently being rediscovered by today’s philosophers of biology (Meincke 2018a, Weber & Varela 2002, Gilbert 
& Sarkar 2000, Nicholson & Gawne 2015). 
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be maintained (Meincke 2018a, forthcoming). On this view, change is constitutive of identity 
through time, this identity to be understood as genuinely processual and lacking sharp 
boundaries. Processes in nature come in nested hierarchies, being entangled with one another 
through various forms of interaction. 
The recent interest in process ontology within the context of the philosophy of biology is 
triggered by the growing non-reductionist systems biological perspective in the study of life: 
when being considered as functioning wholes, it appears that organisms are processes, not 
things. Accordingly, endeavours are being made to promote process ontology as the most 
suitable ontological framework for biology, pursuing the ambition to thus alter and enhance 
scientific practices and the acquisition of new biological knowledge (Nicholson & Dupré 2018). 
The claim is that the systems biological turn in biology has to be accompanied by a process 
ontological turn with respect to the underlying ontological framework.  
In this paper, I shall not directly argue for this claim even though it is not (yet) a popular one 
and has been met with explicit criticism in the mechanistic camp of philosophers of biology 
(Austin 2016). Assuming that some version of process ontology is indeed appropriate for 
biology, I shall instead address the question of whether the process ontological turn envisaged 
for biology and the philosophy of biology is actually compatible with the appeal to biological 
autonomy and autopoiesis common among the supporters of the non-reductionist stream of 
the systems biological turn. If so, this would lend indirect support to the project of combining 
these two turns.  
The task, hence, is to assess the theories of autopoiesis and biological autonomy against the 
background of the two competing ontologies, thing or substance ontology on the one hand 
and process ontology on the other. Are the concepts of autopoiesis and biological autonomy 
neutral in the sense that they could be combined with either ontology? Are they actually 
rooted in substance ontological ideas, as one might surmise on semantic grounds? Or do they 
rather, if understood properly, call for a process view of life? I shall argue for the latter, by 
defending the theories in question against substance ontological misunderstandings while at 
the same time indicating relevant differences between them and identifying potentially 
problematic points.  
Autopoiesis, Biological Autonomy & the Process View of Life (12 August 2018) | Meincke, Anne Sophie 
 
4 
 
I shall proceed as follows: I shall first explain in what sense the theory of autopoiesis seems 
clearly committed to a process view of life. I shall then raise some worries as to how deep this 
commitment actually goes by looking at the idea that autopoietic systems realise so-called 
organisational closure, and by discussing how the theory of biological autonomy re-
conceptualises closure in the attempt to remedy what appear as deficits of the autopoiesis 
theory.  This discussion will clarify why living systems, whether understood according to the 
former or the latter theory, cannot be substances. 
2. Autopoiesis: A Process View 
The theory of autopoiesis was developed by the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela in the last century. ‘Autopoiesis’ translates to self-production and is meant 
to provide a universal criterion of life purely in terms of the organisation characteristic of living 
systems: any system exhibiting autopoietic organisation, on this view, qualifies as a living 
system: “the notion of autopoiesis is necessary and sufficient to characterize the organization 
of living systems” (Maturana & Varela 1980, 82).6 The autopoiesis theory thus follows a 
relationalist (or formalist) paradigm in explaining life: life is taken to be constituted by specific 
relations between material components so that it is impossible to define and identify these 
components independently of those relations. Even though, admittedly, the actual material 
basis of a given autopoietic system has an impact on how autopoiesis is realised,7 the 
organisation is claimed to be fundamentally the same in any material instances of autopoiesis 
and, i.e., of life.8  
Maturana and Varela emphasise that this organisation is the same not only across individual 
living systems but also across time in any given individual living system, namely in a distinctive 
manner that sets autopoietic organisation apart from other types of organisation: 
                                                          
6 All italics in quotes are taken from the original if not stated otherwise. 
7 “The actual way in which such an [autopoietic] organization may in fact be implemented in the physical space, 
that is, the physical structure of the machine, varies according to the nature (properties) of the materials which 
embody it” (Maturana & Varela 1980, 81). 
8 “It is our assumption that there is an organization that is common to all living systems, whichever the nature of 
their components” (Maturana & Varela 1980, 76). An even more radical version of this view is Robert Rosen’s 
relational biology that is said to follow the maxim “Throw away the matter and keep the underlying organization” 
(Rosen 1991, 119). According to Rosen, “[t]he most materially disparate natural systems can still be analogous” 
if they share the same “bauplan” (ibid.). “Life is the manifestation of a certain kind of (relational) model. A 
particular material system is living if it realizes this model” (Rosen 1991, 254).  
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An organization may remain constant by being static, by maintaining its 
components constant, or by maintaining constant certain relations between 
components otherwise in continuous flow or change. Autopoietic machines are 
organizations of the latter kind: they maintain constant the relations that define 
them as autopoietic.  
(Maturana & Varela 1980, 81) 
The diachronic identity of a living system does not depend on the diachronic identity of its 
material parts or components but rather on the diachronic identity of the relations between 
those components. This is important because there is no such thing as a diachronic identity of 
material components in living systems, at least not in the sense of a given set of entities 
identifiable and re-identifiable independently of the functional role they play in the system as 
a whole. Instead, we know that the components of living systems undergo constant material 
renewal; they are, as Maturana and Varela put it in the quoted passage, “in continuous flow 
or change”. 
Autopoietic organisation thus seems characterised by a discrepancy, or even tension, between 
the stability of the relations on the one hand and the instability of the relata of these relations 
on the other. However, this is not yet the full truth about autopoietic organisation. It would, 
for instance, be wrong to think of an autopoietic system as being comparable to a network of 
pipes accommodating a constant flow of water, or to honeycombs containing fluid honey. 
What is missing in these latter systems is interdependency between the stable structure and 
its unstable contents, an interdependency that actually proves inappropriate any analysis of 
living systems in terms of a container-content model.9 Organisms are not containers of 
changing stuff. Instead, what changing stuff there is, and how it changes over time, is 
determined by the organisation of the system. At the same time, this organisation is itself 
maintained through the individual changes performed. The stability of the relations between 
the components of autopoietic systems is not a given but brought about by the ever-changing 
and interacting components of these systems; it is the result of processes of on-going 
stabilisation. 
                                                          
9 This is why Maturana and Varela resist categorising autocatalytic processes as instances of autopoiesis: 
“Autocatalytic processes do not constitute autopoietic systems because among other things, they do not 
determine their topology. Their topology is determined by a container that is part of the specification of the 
system, but which is independent of the operation of the autocatalysis” (Maturana & Varela 1980, 94). 
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The neologism ‘autopoiesis’ aims to capture both the productive and the self-recursive 
character of the organisation of living systems. Here is Maturana and Varela’s well-known 
definition: 
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as unity) as a network of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that 
produces the components which:  
(i)  through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and 
realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and 
(ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the 
components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as 
such a network. 
(Maturana & Varela 1980, 78f.) 
The network of processes of production of components produces the components which in 
turn produce the network of processes of production of components. Paradigmatically we find 
this in the metabolic cycle of the cell as the simplest and most fundamental unit of life, where 
the exchange of matter and energy with the environment allowed for by membrane 
boundaries permits the bounded dynamics of a metabolic network which produces the 
metabolites that constitute the membrane boundaries (Varela 1997, 75).  
Living systems are self-producing systems in this sense – and they are nothing over and above 
self-production: if they stop metabolising, they cease to exist. There is no unchanging core, 
exempted from the turnover of matter and energy; instead self-maintenance is achieved 
through an all-encompassing process of destruction and reconstruction: 
Since the relations of production of components are given only as processes, if 
the processes stop, the relations of production vanish; as a result, for the machine 
to be autopoietic, its defining relations of production must be continuously 
regenerated by the components which they produce.  
(Maturana & Varela 1980, 79) 
The stability of the relations between the parts observable through time, hence, is in fact 
brought about by process and change. Paradoxically speaking, we can say that the parts of 
autopoietic systems change, and have to change, such that the relations that define them do 
not change but remain stable.  
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This assigns a role to change which, against the background of traditional Western 
metaphysics, is rather provocative. For centuries, we have been told by substance ontology 
that change presupposes identity, namely the identity of a substance; it was held to be 
inconceivable that it could somehow be the other way around. Living systems teach us that 
the allegedly inconceivable is not only possible but in fact the rule in biology. Certain changes 
or processes need to happen in order for living systems to continue existing over time 
(Meincke 2018a, forthcoming). The fact that living systems do exist over time so that we can 
reidentify them as numerically the same at different times, should not tempt us to overlook 
their thoroughly processual character. Autopoiesis as described by Maturana and Varela is 
clearly a process; and so are autopoietic systems, which are defined solely in terms of their 
autopoietic organisation. As Varela puts it: “Organisms are fundamentally the process of 
constitution of an identity”, to which he adds: identity is “not meant as a static structural 
description (it is a process)” (Varela 1997, 73). 
I thus disagree with DiFrisco’s (2014) diagnosis that the “picture of the living system” 
presented by the theory of autopoietic is “static” (510), by dismissing the “generative” 
character of the relations between the components of living systems (509; cf. also 510). 
DiFrisco infers this from the alleged commitment of the autopoiesis theory to the doctrine of 
‘hylomorphism’ which he – following the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, but somewhat 
deviating from the common understanding – defines as a “pattern of thinking which separates 
the ‘form’ of the living system from its ‘matter’” (499).10 DiFrisco sees this hylomorphistic 
commitment at work in the relationist approach of the autopoiesis theory, which motivates 
his double claim that (a) that the autopoiesis theory, as a result, conceives of living systems as 
machines (510) and (b) in doing so neglects these systems’ dynamicity (506, 508).  
However, apart from the fact that Maturana and Varela explicitly deploy a dynamist 
understanding of the term ‘machine’ (1980, 76),11 the relationalist approach does not at all 
rule out the dynamicity of autopoietic systems, namely, as we have seen, precisely not 
                                                          
10 Common philosophical understanding stresses the inseparability of matter and form which are taken to 
constitute a genuine unity according to hylomorphism, as opposed to dualistic accounts. 
11 “We maintain that living systems are machines and by doing this we point at several notions which should be 
made explicit. First, we imply a non-animistic view which it should be unnecessary to discuss any further. Second, 
we are emphasizing that a living system is defined by its organization and, hence, that it can be explained as any 
organization is explained, that is, in terms of relations, not of component properties. Finally, we are pointing out 
from the start the dynamism apparent in living systems and which the word ‘machine’ connotes.” 
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because of the assumed thoroughly processual character of autopoiesis. Maturana and Varela 
make this clear once more when explaining why a crystal, whose organisation “is specified by 
the spatial relations which define the relative position of its components” (1980, 79) does not 
qualify as autopoietic:  
although we find spatial relations among [an autopoietic machine’s] components 
whenever we actually or conceptually freeze it for an observation, the observed 
spatial relations do not (and cannot) define it as autopoietic. This is so because 
the spatial relations between the components of an autopoietic machine are 
specified by the network of processes of production of components which 
constitute its organization and they are therefore necessarily in continuous 
change. A crystal organization then, lies in a different domain than the 
autopoietic organization: a domain of relations between components, not of 
relations between processes of production of components; a domain of 
processes, not of concatenation of processes. We normally acknowledge this by 
saying that crystals are static.  
(Maturana & Varela 1980, 79f.; italics added).  
The (according to DiFrisco) allegedly missing acknowledgement of the ‘generative’ character 
of the relations between the components of living systems is exactly the key point of 
acknowledging living systems as autopoietic systems. 
In the light of its core claims so far considered, the autopoiesis theory, hence, appears to be 
clearly committed to a process view of life. Understanding organisms as autopoietic systems 
means to understand them as self-organising biological processes, i.e., as a specific class of 
dynamic entities for the identity of which change is essential. Insofar as these self-organising 
processes can be scientifically investigated, the theory paves the way for a research 
programme that is naturalistic (‘mechanistic’ in Maturana and Varela’s terminology) in 
allowing for a scientific study of the origin and constitution of life in purely natural terms, and 
yet is anti-reductionist by prioritising the examination of the life-constituting processes over 
the examination of the material parts involved in these processes.12 The theory of autopoiesis 
                                                          
12 Maturana and Varela use the term ‘mechanistic’ as an antonym of ‘vitalistic’ (1980, 74), i.e., devoid of the 
reductionist connotations the term has today: “Our approach will be mechanistic: no forces or principles will be 
adduced which are not to be found in the physical universe. Yet, our problem is the living organization and 
therefore our interest will not be in properties of components, but in processes and relations between processes 
realized through components” (1980, 75).  
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thus seems to possess the potential to serve as a fruitful resource for underpinning the claim 
that process ontology is the framework appropriate for (systems) biology. 
3.  Biological Autonomy: The Improved Closure Thesis 
However, there are also difficulties to which we shall turn now. We shall hereby look only at 
those difficulties relevant to the present task of assessing the autopoiesis theory with respect 
to its ontological commitments.13 Is this theory really a credible proponent of a process view 
of life? What might make one hesitate to affirm this is a feature that has been discussed 
controversially in other contexts: the idea that autopoiesis is a form of ‘organisational closure’.  
According to Varela, “[o]rganizational closure […] arises through the circular concatenation of 
processes to constitute an interdependent network” (Varela 1979, Ch. 7.2.7, 2.; Varela 1981, 
16). Again, most paradigmatically and fundamentally organisational (or operational) closure is 
realised in metabolism, as visualised here: 
 
Fig. 1: “Outline of the autopoietic closure of the minimal living organization” 
Varela (1997), 75 
Autopoiesis, as evident from the diagram, involves some form of circular causality: there is a 
feedback loop between the membrane boundaries and the metabolic network. And there are 
many more (negative and positive) feedback loops in living systems. Living systems are a 
special case of non-linear dynamical systems as being studied by dynamical systems theory.  
                                                          
13 Other controversially discussed features of the theory include its dismissal of reproduction and evolution and 
its equation of life with cognition. For a defence against these criticisms cf. Luisi (2003). 
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This seems harmless until we consider the fact that we are talking here about feedback loops 
between relations of component production: living systems are supposed to be self-producing 
systems insofar as the process of autopoietic identity is “a circular reflexive interlinking 
process, whose primary effect is its own production” (Varela 1997, 73). Does this mean, as 
Moreno & Barandiaran (2008, 329) put it, that “the system, as a whole, is cause and effect of 
itself”? Clearly, a living system is no causa sui. An organism might maintain itself; but it has 
not caused itself to exist:14 it was rather brought into existence by its parents or parent cells.15 
However, even with respect to self-maintenance one might be wary: an organism is no 
perpetuum mobile either. It does not run by itself. The process of self-maintenance rather 
depends essentially on interaction with the environment: metabolism is exchange of matter 
and energy with the environment.  
It seems indeed that the environment’s contribution to the self-maintenance of organisms is 
somewhat underestimated in the theory of autopoiesis. Though the existence and necessity 
of an autopoietic system’s interaction with the environment is in principle acknowledged, the 
concept of organisational closure emphasises that any such autopoietic system “attains 
coherence through its own operation, and not through the intervention of contingencies from 
the environment” (Varela 1979, 55). Rather than being the environment’s achievement, it is 
the organism’s own achievement that it continues to exist as a unity in time. According to 
Maturana and Varela, it is in fact “the most peculiar characteristic of an autopoietic system 
[…] that it erects itself by its own means, and constitutes itself as distinct from the 
environment by way of its own dynamics” (Maturana & Varela 1992, 30; italics added). 
In this picture, the environment appears as something hostile against the resistance of which 
identity through time needs to be defended. Autopoietic systems lose their boundaries if they 
fail to bring about organisational closure, and, hence, they vanish.16 Organisational closure, 
                                                          
14 Moreno recognises this in Moreno & Mossio (2015), 5f. (fn. 7): “Biological systems maintain themselves but 
do not generate themselves spontaneously (as wholes, although of course they do generate some [sic] their 
functional components).” 
15 Maturana and Varela (1980) famously dismiss reproduction as not being essential to life: “Reproduction 
requires a unity to be reproduced; this is why reproduction is operationally secondary to the establishment of 
the unity, and it cannot enter as a defining feature of the organization of living systems” (100) (cf. already 
footnote 13). 
16 “[T]he the unity’s boundaries, in whichever space the processes exist, is [sic] indissolubly linked to the 
operation of the system. If the organization of closure is disrupted, the unity disappears” (Varela 1979, 55). 
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accordingly, is thought to involve an exploitation of all changes for the maintenance of 
identity,17 with the result of minimising the effects of environmental changes on the internal 
dynamics of the autopoietic system. This is captured in the idea of ‘structural determinism’ 
according to which external events only ‘trigger’, rather than ‘determine’, structural change 
in an autopoietic system, such as when a washing machine starts washing after somebody 
pressed the relevant button (Maturana 1987, 73). As a consequence, there is no room for the 
possibility of any internal changes of the autopoietic system being ‘instructed’ by the 
environment in the sense that we could trace them back in some direct way to what happened 
in the environment.18 Instead, the environment is seen in the first place as a source of 
‘perturbations’ which are compensated by the autopoietic system through internal structural 
changes.19 
Whatever other critical points would need to be raised about the concept of organisational 
closure,20 the point that matters for the present investigation is that some of the 
characterisations of autopoiesis linked to that concept may create the impression of the 
autopoietic system being a self-contained unit isolated from its surroundings via some in-built 
self-protection mechanism called ‘closure’. Identity, according to this interpretation of the 
autopoiesis theory, is admittedly processually constituted; but in a way that perpetuates the 
old story of the individual with well-defined boundaries. The very fact of forming a causal circle 
seems to deeply divorce the autopoietic process from its environment. It thus does not come 
as a surprise that the apparent closed-off character of the autopoietic system or ‘self’ is a 
recurring theme in common readings of the theory, whether critical or sympathetic (e.g., 
                                                          
17 “[…] closure and the system’s identity are interlocked, in such a way that it is a necessary consequence for an 
organizationally closed system to subordinate all changes to the maintenance of its identity” (Varela 1979, 58). 
18 Varela therefore actually rejects speaking of ‘feedback’ as this concept “requires and implies an external source 
of reference, which is completely absent in organizational closure” (Varela 1979, 56). 
19 “[A]ll apparent informational exchanges with its environment will be, and can only be, treated as perturbations 
within the processes that define its closure, and thus no “instructions” or “programming” can possibly exist” 
(Varela 1979, 58). “Autopoietic machines do not have inputs or outputs. They can be perturbated by independent 
events and undergo internal structural changes which compensate these perturbations” (Maturana & Varela 
1980, 81). 
20 One of these is the question of whether in order for a system to qualify as autopoietic it really has to produce 
all of its components itself. As we now know, organisms provide accommodation for plenty of other organisms, 
and even in cells there are components which are not directly produced, such as essential amino acids, maybe 
also mitochondrial DNA.  
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Villalobos & Ward 2015, Pradeu 2012, 197ff., Swenson 1992). Is the autopoietic system, 
hence, just a substance wolf in process sheep’s clothing? 
The time has come to look at a theory that claims to address the shortcomings of the 
autopoiesis theory while building upon its strengths: the theory of biological autonomy, 
developed in the last two decades by Alvaro Moreno and a number of collaborators (e.g., 
Moreno & Mossio 2015, Arnellos & Moreno 2015, Barandiaran & Moreno 2008). Against the 
current prevalence of evolution-centred explanations of life, the theory of biological 
autonomy intends to raise awareness for the fact that “organisms, understood as cohesive 
and spatially bounded entities”, are the fundamental instances of “the biological domain’s 
organised complexity” (Moreno & Mossio 2015, xxiii). Organisms are characterised as systems 
realising biological autonomy, namely in the following sense: 
[T]he constitutive organisation of biological systems realises a distinct regime of 
causation, able not only of producing and maintaining the parts that contribute 
to the functioning of the system as an integrated, operational, and topologically 
distinct whole but also able to promote the conditions of its own existence 
through its interaction with the environment. 
(Moreno & Mossio 2015, xxvif.)  
As indicated by this definition, two dimensions of biological autonomy – “two regimes of 
causation” (e.g., 11) – need to be distinguished, namely the constitutive dimension of 
metabolic self-constitution21 and the interactive dimension of adaptive interaction with the 
environment (xxviii). However, this difference must not be understood in the sense that the 
two dimensions would somehow be independent of one another. Instead, it is claimed to be 
crucial to acknowledge that the constitutive dimension requires the interactive dimension of 
biological autonomy. This is because as far-from-equilibrium dissipative structures, living 
systems, while being operationally closed, are energetically open: they are 
“thermodynamically ‘hungry’, in need of coupling with the environment” (Barandiaran & 
Moreno 2008, 328). In return it follows that while, in more complex organisms, the interactive 
dimension of autonomy can be locally decoupled from its metabolic basis (as it is the case with 
behavioural agency that is sustained by the nervous system (Moreno & Mossio 2015, 175ff.), 
                                                          
21 Elsewhere this dimension is also referred to as ‘basic autonomy’ (e.g., Moreno & Etxeberria 2005). 
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the functions of any adaptive interactions with the environment are to be regarded as deriving 
from the core function of metabolic self-constitution (90).22 
As a matter of fact, Maturana and Varela do recognise the interactive dimension of living 
systems by assigning a pivotal role to metabolism in the constitution of autopoiesis. Moreno 
and colleagues accordingly concede that closure, in the autopoiesis theory, “goes hand in 
hand with interactive openness” and so “by no means meant to signify the ‘independence’ of 
the system vis-à-vis the external environment” (Moreno & Mossio 2015, 6); but they insist, 
given the fundamental importance of the interactive dimension, that it should “enter into the 
definition-constitution of the autonomous system” (Moreno & Mossio 2015, xxvii) rather than 
being “added, a posteriori, in the form of structural coupling” (Barandiaran & Moreno 2008, 
327). Only this, they further argue, will also ensure that the resulting account delivers a 
criterion that applies uniquely to living systems as opposed to non-living systems. 
The criticism that the autopoiesis theory falls short of sufficiently distinguishing between the 
living and the non-living guides the construction of the proposed alternative account of living 
systems in terms of autonomy. Moreno and Mossio accept Varela’s ‘Closure Thesis’, according 
to which “[e]very autonomous system is organizationally closed” (Varela 1979, 58), but they 
complain that the account, as it stands, “fails to locate closure at the relevant level of 
causation” (Moreno & Mossio 2015, 4). The reason they identify for this is the fact that 
“closure is understood as closure of processes” (ibid.) rather than as a closure of so-called 
constraints, the latter being defined as “local and contingent causes, exerted by specific 
structures or processes, which reduce the degrees of freedom of the system on which they 
act” (5).23 While closure of processes is realised also by physical and chemical systems, such 
as, for instance, the hydrologic cycle, what is distinctive about biological systems, according 
to Moreno and colleagues, is that these systems bring about closure of the constraints acting 
upon constitutive processes (ibid.). This “capacity for self-determination, in the form of self-
constraint” (ibid.) is meant by the definitional statement that a biological system, in addition 
to its ability to maintain itself, is “able to promote the conditions of its own existence through 
its interaction with the environment” (xxvif.; cf. above). 
                                                          
22 Arnellos & Moreno (2015) coin the term ‘constitutive-interactive closure principle’ for the reciprocal 
relationship between the two dimensions of biological autonomy. 
23 For this and the following see also Montévil & Mossio (2015) on which Moreno and Mossio substantially rely. 
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As evident already from this rough outline, the theory of biological autonomy makes a 
valuable contribution to clarifying the notion of closure by elaborating on aspects that (to say 
the least) remained underdeveloped within the framework of the autopoiesis theory. Most 
importantly in the present context, the environment gets upgraded from a mere source of 
perturbations to playing an essential role in the self-constitution of organisms. An organism’s 
necessary interaction with its environment is acknowledged as constituting a separate order 
of causation, which provides the ontological basis also for more sophisticated interactions 
with the environment than to be found in metabolism, i.e., for higher forms of agency 
(Moreno & Mossio 2015, ch. 4, Arnellos & Moreno 2015, Barandiaran & Moreno 2008).24 In 
fact, to act in some robust sense of the word is to actively engage in an exchange with 
environmental entities, including actively seeking for opportunities for such engagements. It 
is difficult to accommodate this active and outgoing character of interaction in a picture that, 
as the one drawn by the autopoiesis theory, emphasises the protective function of 
organisational closure of minimising influences from the environment. 
However, again there is a possible concern with respect to the ontological commitments of 
the theory of biological autonomy. Although it looks as if thinking of living systems in terms of 
biological autonomy rather than autopoiesis helped to prevent the impression of them being 
some sort of encapsulated, purely self-referential and in that sense substance-like entities, we 
might wonder whether this move comes at the cost of compromising on the process character 
of life in other respects. This has to do exactly with the thesis central to the theory of biological 
autonomy that organisational closure has to be understood as a closure of constraints rather 
than of processes. Where does this leave the key claim of the autopoiesis theory that living 
systems exist in the mode of producing their own identity through time, i.e., that living 
systems are processes? 
In order to answer this question we need to get a grasp on what ‘constraints’ are supposed to 
be. Moreno and Mossio distinguish them from ‘processes’ as follows:   
Processes refer to the whole set of physicochemical changes (including 
reactions) occurring in biological systems, which involve the alteration, 
consumption and/or production of relevant entities. Constraints, in turn, refer to 
                                                          
24 For a discussion of this theory of bio-agency with respect to the possibility of artificial agents cf. Meincke 
(2018b). 
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entities that, while acting upon these processes, can be said to remain 
unaffected by them, at least under certain conditions or from a certain point of 
view.  
(Moreno & Mossio 2015, 11) 
In order to be able to constrain the processes of metabolic self-constitution, the entities in 
question cannot, and must not, themselves be involved in those processes; they rather need 
to “exhibit symmetry with respect to a process (or a set of processes) that they help stabilise” 
in the sense that their “relevant aspects […] be conserved under the transformations” (ibid.). 
Examples discussed are the vascular system’s regulation of the flow of oxygen and an 
enzyme’s speeding up a chemical reaction (11ff.): these effects would not be possible if the 
vascular system lost its regulating powers on the way and the enzyme its speeding up powers 
respectively. Constraints are stabilisers of processes; and in order to do their stabilising work 
they need to be stable themselves. 
It is, however, fair to ask how they become stable in the first place. And here Moreno and 
Mossio give us an important hint: constraints must display symmetry “at that time scale […] 
at which their causal action is exerted” (13). This is important because, as a matter of fact, 
entities like the vascular system or enzymes do change in relevant respects at other (longer or 
shorter) time scales (ibid.). Hence, even though constraints theoretically “can be treated, at 
[the relevant time scale], as if they were not thermodynamic objects because, by definition, 
they are conserved with respect to the thermodynamic flow, on which they exert a causal 
action” (14), this does not mean that they ontologically are not ‘thermodynamic objects’. They 
are thermodynamic objects just like all other components of living systems. Whatever part of 
an organism comes to take over the function of a constraint on more basic processes is 
dependent for its own existence on these processes – not directly, but at least indirectly.  
We thus can admit that the specific causation Moreno and Mossio describe by referring to 
entities called constraints25 does not involve a (direct) thermodynamic “flow between the 
constraint and the constrained process or reaction” (15), while denying that this, in ontological 
terms, diminishes the processual character of living systems as conceptualised by the theory 
of biological autonomy.  Living systems are nested hierarchies of processes which are more or 
                                                          
25 Moreno & Mossio (2015, 52ff.) refuse to rely on the notion of ‘formal causation’ while regarding causation 
through constraints as a weak form of ‘downward causation’. 
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less stable depending on the time scales at which they are described, and depending on which 
other processes they are compared with. In other words: what Moreno and Mossio address 
as constraints are, ontologically speaking, processes too, just slower ones compared to the 
processes constrained. And these latter processes are themselves stabilised through other 
constraining processes, with all these processes forming a “network of mutually depending 
constraints” (57). This, in fact, corresponds well with the core insight of the autopoiesis theory 
that a living system exists as the process of producing its own identity.26 
4. Conclusions 
I have argued that both the theory of autopoiesis and the theory of biological autonomy are 
committed to a process view of life. Both theories analyse living systems as entities that exist 
by making themselves exist in a continuous process of self-production, most fundamentally 
through metabolism as the exchange of matter and energy with the environment. Within the 
theoretical frameworks offered, there is, hence, no way to make sense of living systems in 
static terms; if we abstract away from change and motion, we lose sight of what we intend to 
investigate: the living system, or organism, as such. Any stability to be observed in living 
systems is the result of continuous process and change. This emphasis on the genuinely 
processual mode of existence of living systems entails, as we have seen, a strong anti-
reductionist stance: the identity of a living system cannot be reduced to the identity of its 
parts insofar as the identity of the parts is itself dependent on the production of the identity 
of the living system as a whole. It is therefore impossible to treat an organism as a thing that 
is composed of smaller things.  
However, I have also discussed some27 other respects in which it might seem that living 
systems, as viewed by the autopoiesis theory and the theory of biological autonomy, actually 
                                                          
26 I am therefore not entirely convinced of Moreno and Mossio’s criticism that the autopoiesis theory, by lacking 
“the (explicit) theoretical distinction between processes and constraints” (2015, 6), also fails to provide a 
sufficiently sharp distinction between living and non-living systems. Maturana and Varela’s emphasis that an 
autopoietic system “has its own organization (defining network of relations) as the fundamental variable which 
it maintains constant” (1980, 79), and that the “concatenation of processes” rather than mere processes alone 
make an organisation autopoietic (79f.; quoted above), points towards a view in line with the idea that living 
systems, qua autonomous systems, promote the conditions of their own existence. This does not touch on the 
point that the theory of biological autonomy deserves credit for fleshing out the interactive dimension inherent 
in this autopoietic process. 
27 One aspect left out for reasons of space concerns the ontological status of boundaries. The emphasis on 
boundaries in both the autopoiesis theory and the theory of biological autonomy might seem reminiscent of the 
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do resemble things so that one would have to doubt the consistency and depth of these 
theories’ commitment to a process view of life. Does the concept of organisational closure not 
draw the picture of an entity that, by producing itself, is ontologically independent of its 
environment, i.e., the picture of a self-contained, isolated individual that has become famous 
and predominant in Western philosophy under the title of ‘substance’? I have argued that this 
is not the case. Autopoiesis does not refer to circular causality in the sense of a causa sui; and, 
as Moreno and Mossio (2015) repeatedly emphasise, “autonomy is not independence” (17, 
88, 97, 197). We can see this more clearly when – as undertaken by the theory of biological 
autonomy – acknowledging in explicit terms the interactive dimension that is inherent in the 
process of metabolic self-constitution in virtue of the system’s thermodynamic openness. At 
the same time, we can – as equally suggested – do theoretical justice to the associated 
distinctive form of causation, that is, to the generation of closure through a mutual 
dependence of constraints acting upon processes of self-constitution, while bearing in mind 
that any such constraining causation, ontologically speaking, is a case of (higher-level) 
processes acting upon (lower-level) processes. 
It thus turns out that the concepts of autopoiesis and biological autonomy are not neutral 
against the alternative between substance ontology and process ontology. There is no 
coherent way to reconcile the idea of autopoietic or biologically autonomous entities with 
these entities being substances. Substances, as considered by philosophers for more than two 
millennia, do not constitute and maintain themselves through interacting with the 
environment. Their identity is supposed to precede any change they might undergo, this not 
leaving any space for something like an environment to matter, let alone for this environment 
to take over a constructive role in a process of constitution of identity. As meritoriously 
highlighted by the theory of autopoiesis and the theory of biological autonomy, organisms, by 
contrast, are entities for the identity of which change, including ex-change with the 
environment, is essential, which is to say that they are processes. Autopoiesis and biological 
autonomy, if understood properly, call for a process view of life. 
                                                          
idea of a substance as a discrete particular neatly separated from its surroundings. As I intend to show elsewhere, 
this impression is mistaken. Living boundaries – properly understood – do not isolate the organism from the 
environment but rather allow for, and enact, the interaction with the environment that is constitutive of the 
organism’s synchronic and diachronic existence. Living boundaries, in both theories, are processual just as living 
systems are.  
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The good news for those who aim to promote a process ontological turn in the scientific and 
philosophical investigation of life, hence, is that they can find in the autopoiesis theory and in 
the theory of biological autonomy two trustworthy and helpful allies for their endeavours. 
Similarly, those seeking to resist reductionist mechanistic research agendas in biology and the 
philosophy of biology with a convincing holistic approach are well-advised to turn to process 
ontology in general and to the rich body of theory provided under the headings of 
‘autopoiesis’ and ‘biological autonomy’ specifically. Insofar as such a holistic approach is the 
objective of an increasingly important part of systems biology, this underpins the claim that 
the systems biological turn in the study of biological life should take the form of a systems-
biological-cum-process-ontological turn. 
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